In these remarks I make an attempt to understand and present the functioning of authorities in science. I do use in the first place the earlier claims which present this issue in a historical perspective. This allows to grasp the social process of emergence of the authorities as well the changing of their position in the way they are functioning. Especially the thoughts of Max Weber are being considered by my as useful in this matter. I do share his general thesis saying that even the greatest of scientific authorities – called by me in these remarks ”centennial” – couldn't occur and function without their social and cultural ”background”. This had led in large extent to the situation where these authorities fist played a significant role in the development of science and then went over to a more or less dignified ”retirement”. In this and other issues I present some of my own remarks and sugestions.
In Poland the position of a leader of political party Law and Justice has become the most important position in the country. His will has the power of law. The boundary between his will and the will of a state has blurred. The leader holds unlimited power, although he does not hold any public position. He is beyond legislative, executive and judiciary. The constitutional rule of control, complementing and hindering was replaced by charismatic power of the leader of Law and Justice. The power in Poland is held by one man. The „new law order” (Constitutional Court, National Council of the Judiciary of Poland, common courts, Supreme Court, prosecutors office) serves political purposes of the leader of Law and Justice. That is the reason for judges exchange in Poland. Lawlessness has become law. Law has been turned into a political instrument and it was done in the most vulgar way. Law serves Law and Justice’s political purpose, with disregard and disrespect to constitutional values. The system of constitutional values is not relevant for Law and Justice in the process of establishing law. A system based on autocracy is created. The main legislative competence is held by the leader of Law and Justice. Systematically, with absolute consistency, a totalitarian regime is built, where legislative and executive is under control of one man, who himself remains out of constitutional control and has no constitutional responsibility.
The subject of this article is an analysis of the earliest of Karl Marx’s articles, Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction. The essence of his views presented in that article was to protest against the restriction of the right to free expression of opinions by journalists. Marx pointed out that the new Prussian Censorship Instruction only seemed to liberalize censorship, but in fact in many aspects tightened the rules, for example, reinforced those that pertained to religious criticism. He thought that the Prussian Censorship Instruction was not an enactment of law, because by limiting freedom, lawmakers acted against the essence of the press, law and state. Marx thought that a press law was needed to guarantee freedom of the press and that censorship should be abolished entirely.
This article explores the legal principles that govern the interpretation of “secondary instruments” in international law. A “secondary instrument” under international law is, for the purposes of this article, a written document adopted by a body empowered by a treaty to take action with respect to the treaty, but which is not itself a treaty. Such instruments find increasing application in international law. The article specifically examines the interpretation of secondary instruments arising in five settings in international practice: the United Nations Security Council, the International Maritime Organization, the International Seabed Authority, the International Whaling Commission, and conferences/meetings of the parties under multilateral treaties. This selection of practice will serve to illustrate principles of interpretation across a range of international institutional settings for the purpose of determining the rights and obligations of state-parties to a treaty regime.