Krytycyzm, który pojawił się w nowożytnej filozofii, w istotnym stopniu różnił się od swoich starożytnych i średniowiecznych odpowiedników. Celem rozważań jest prezentacja wskazanych w tytule form krytycyzmu Kartezjusza, Hume’a i Kanta, połączona z wykazaniem, że wszystkie one artykułowane były w opozycji do dwóch głównych teoretycznych adwersarzy, tj. dogmatyzmu oraz sceptycyzmu.
In these remarks I recall the attempts of pointing out the relations between philosophy and modernity in sciences in three distinctively differing point of view, that is the achievements of “the Enlightened Age” (in the sense of Ernst Cassirer), phenomenological philosophy (in the sense of Edmund Husserl) and the classicist conservatism (in the sense of Allan Bloom). In each of these cases an importance of those relations is being acknowledged. However it is not just differently evaluated and justified, but also the diagnoses and forecasts related to it look differently either.
In these remarks I make an attempt to understand and present the functioning of authorities in science. I do use in the first place the earlier claims which present this issue in a historical perspective. This allows to grasp the social process of emergence of the authorities as well the changing of their position in the way they are functioning. Especially the thoughts of Max Weber are being considered by my as useful in this matter. I do share his general thesis saying that even the greatest of scientific authorities – called by me in these remarks ”centennial” – couldn't occur and function without their social and cultural ”background”. This had led in large extent to the situation where these authorities fist played a significant role in the development of science and then went over to a more or less dignified ”retirement”. In this and other issues I present some of my own remarks and sugestions.
The issue in the title is known and is being analyzed for a long time, however its complexity makes the setting of both – the future of it and contemporary form – emerge a lot of questions marks. I do not intend to leave most of them aside. I do make an attempt however to present its complexity and as well the importance in the reflextion upon life and activity of scholars. In these remarks I do recall several ways of presenting it and do make an attempt to stress out those of research possibilities which may lead to interesting outcomes. In the end part of the remakrs I do present some of them. I treat this step as an invitation to further discussion on the sensibility and anger of scholars.
In the first part of these remarks I recall such examples from the past of the mentioned political agenda that might be a sort of warning for a too far reaching overtaking of higher education institutions by political powers. In the second part, however, I recall contemporary ways and forms of political agenda, which I call “velvet” revolutions and I also see them as threat to fulfill by universities their social missions. The remarks and evaluations formulated by me at the end are certainly not to be considered. These remarks are being treated by me as a voice in the discussion on the issue how much politics might be or has to be in the life of universities, what kind of politics do any good to them and what kind brings more damage.
In these considerations, I undertake a polemic with thinking based on the assumption that the value of scientific achievements can be measured with almost mathematical accuracy and give fully reliable point indicators for them. It is not only part of those who introduce the current reform of higher education and science in Poland, but also experts who support them, as well as some representatives of science and natural sciences. This thinking was called point syndrome and expert syndrome. Although it was diagnosed as a manifestation of academic disease a few years ago, it still not only finds its supporters, but also translates into activities, which in some scholars cause astonishment, in others indignation, and still strong opposition in others.