The main aim of the essay is to examine three philosophical narrations. One of them, Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, clearly inspired the other two, that is: Marx’s reflections in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the interpretation of the Odyssey in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Whereas Hegel’s dialectic opens a perspective of mutual recognition of individuals, permanently codified in their fundamental rights, the two remaining narrations lead to totally different conclusions. According to young Marx, the subjects not only do not recognize themselves mutually but even, under the influence of economic relationships, treat each other with disregard. Also in Adorno and Horkehimer’s view the labor processes, which according to Hegel led towards the freedom of individuals, distort interpersonal relations and strengthen the growing coercion. At the end, the proposal of Jürgen Habermas is taken into consideration. He argues that communication acts instead of labor processes are the real emancipating factor.
In his philosophical commentary to the thought of Karl Marx, Leszek Kołakowski refers to his assimilation of G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy. He pays particular attention to the swinging of Hegel’s theory ‘the right side up’ and standing him on a pair of feet instead of the head. Marx undertook the difficult task of ensuring a unity of man in a way quite different from the attempts made by either Kant or Hegel. They all wanted to abolish the contingency in human life, but in Marx’s thought the abolishing of the contingency is nothing else but a subjecting of a human being to his/her own existence. A man is no longer dependent on alienated forces that he has created himself, neither is he dependent on an anonymous society. Taking clue from Kołakowski we can say that exteriorisation of natural forces has replaced exteriorisation of consciousness and the Absolute Being of man is realized in his/her actual being.
The author of the article is aimed at reconstructing the concept of academic freedom as a base of university existence, regarding both its didactic and research function. The author takes into account various definitions of academic freedom and analyzes areas and dimensions, especially its institutional (university) and individual (professor) level. He reconstructs also controversies which are exposed in discussions on academic freedom and arguments regarding its limitations. He considers the phenomenon of actuarial policy and various forms of academic competition. He puts question: does the concept of academic freedom can be still vivid in the time of growing commercialization of didactits and research functions of contemporary university as well as its growing dependance on economy and politics?
W miarę wzrostu technologicznego i naukowego zaawansowania współczesnych społeczeństw przyszłość coraz częściej definiowana jest w kategoriach różnych wariantów nieuniknionej synergii człowieka i maszyny. W tym wyobrażeniu ciało człowieka wydaje się jedynie tymczasowym wehikułem, który nie stanowi bynajmniej naszej natury. Cielesność (being flesh) stanowi jedynie etap na drodze nieuchronnego postępu technonauki, który miałby zapewnić człowiekowi wolność morfologiczną. Taką przynajmniej optykę, czy też wizję przyszłości, tworzy transhumanizm. Artykuł jest próbą odczytania, w jaki sposób w transhumanistycznej narracji ciało biologiczne podlega problematyzacji, a także prześledzenia, jak w tym kontekście wymogi technonauki i dostępne możliwości technologicznych interwencji zmieniają i narzucają sposoby rozumienia oraz definiowania ciała. W tym świetle wolność morfologiczna staje się dyscyplinującym imperatywem, a propozycje wyzwolenia z biologii, czy nawet przybrania krzemowych ciał (silicon bodies), zostają dyskursywnie wykreowane jako szanse, a z szans stają się koniecznościami.
The subject of this article is an analysis of the earliest of Karl Marx’s articles, Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction. The essence of his views presented in that article was to protest against the restriction of the right to free expression of opinions by journalists. Marx pointed out that the new Prussian Censorship Instruction only seemed to liberalize censorship, but in fact in many aspects tightened the rules, for example, reinforced those that pertained to religious criticism. He thought that the Prussian Censorship Instruction was not an enactment of law, because by limiting freedom, lawmakers acted against the essence of the press, law and state. Marx thought that a press law was needed to guarantee freedom of the press and that censorship should be abolished entirely.
Wolność i Lud [ Freedom and the People] was the press organ of the agrarian People’s Party Freedom (SL-W) published in London in 1948–1949 and 1953–1954. The periodical, which eventually appeared at monthly intervals, propagated the key ideas of the political programme of the SW-L, kept track of the life of the Polish émigré community and commented on world affairs. It provided regular coverage of the developments in Poland, especially with regard to in agriculture, social transformation processes and culture.
Henryk Elzenberg odcisnął swe piętno na polskiej powojennej myśli politycznej – stał się symbolem intelektualnej i duchowej konsekwencji, co uczyniło zen filozofa czasów trudnych. To o nim Adam Michnik pisał w latach 80. jako o filozofie na „czas głazowładztwa”. Wprawdzie w dorobku autora Kłopotu z istnieniem aktywność intelektualna przybierała różną formę, ewoluowała, zmieniając się pod wpływem dziejowych wydarzeń. Konstrukcje teoretyczne zanurzone w klimacie Młodej Polski znacznie różniły się od tych z okresu międzywojennego, tamte zaś – od zapisek czynionych w czasie drugiej wojny światowej i po niej. Elzenberg niezwykle żywo reagował na zmieniający się wokół niego świat, a myśl teoretyczna podążała za historycznymi wydarzeniami, usiłując ogarnąć je, ukazać w szerszej perspektywie i opisać językiem filozofii. Jednak podstawowym przekonaniom oraz intuicjom ich autor pozostał wierny. Przechodząc kolejne fazy – od aktywnego politycznego zaangażowania, przez indywidualizm i okres aktywności teoretycznej, do wewnętrznej emigracji – pozostał wierny swym głównym twierdzeniom, iż zbiorowość, polityka, ale także jednostka stają się wartościowe nie przez prosty fakt egzystencji, ale dzięki odniesieniu do idei oraz wartości.
The paper’s authors undertake the reflection on the stages of the evolution of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s views on the Church and its role as it is played in the lives of its singular members and in the context of the Reformation’s ethical heritage. One can distinguish among three stages of the Bonhoefferian ecclesiology, deepening his vision of the Church. As far as the first one is considered, the Church is defined as the spiritual community of believers, outside of which salvation is impossible. At the second stage the German theologian accentuates the sinfulness of man as a member of the Church. Its recognition constitutes the basis for the transformation that can take place in the human individual due to accepting Christ into oneself. The third stage is stepping into the world of „before-final” matters in the full responsibility for the choices made by particular members of the ecclesial community. The Church, as Bonhoeffer saw it, was supposed to support itself on strong pillars: on freedom, personal responsibility, imitating Christ, neighbourly love, on sacraments and Gospel. In this aspect Bonhoeffer was the faithful continuator of the Reformation program.
The article is dedicated to the problems of the functioning of people with disabilities in the Polish penitentiary system. It present theoretical considerations, regarding the nature of imprisonment, adaptation problems, types of adaptation strategies, therapeutic system and its limitations, as well as premises for the implementation of own research.
I address the question of Marx’s understanding of the role and function of religion in social life. Marx’s pronouncements on this topic are few and far between. Yet relying on them I undertake to examine the proposal ostensibly made by Marx that it was possible, or even necessary, to purge religious institutions and religious attitudes from social life. I point to a number of inconsistencies and errors that Marx committed in making such proposals.
The article discusses the concentration of Martin Luther’s theology on the Christian existence. There are three main areas pointing to this key idea. Firstly, the description of justification of the people in the categories of freedom gained through the experience of faith, which leads to a thankful service towards one’s neighbour. Secondly, sacramental understanding of the working of God’s Word as a performative that changes the world. It defines not only the understanding of the sacraments, with the key role of Baptism as a foundation for everyday actualisation of Christian life in penance, which strives for fighting off the sinfulness of an old, sinful man, and leads to building the man’s own justice based on the alien justice of Christ, but it is also the basis for the communion of believers – the church, as well as for the orders of creation, which structure the current reality. Thirdly, the remarks on theological knowledge closed in the triad prayer–meditation–temptation and theological weight of the experience of differentiating between the Law and the Gospel.
The article discusses little-known facts from the lives of two great representatives of the Silver Age of Russian philosophy – Nikolai Berdyaev and Sergei Bulgakov – referring to the period when both were ardent Marxists. It discusses the beginning of the academic career of both thinkers, the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In the archives of Karl and Luise Kautsky in Amsterdam (International Institute of Social History) there are two Berdyaev’s letters to Kautsky regarding polemics about Marx and Marxism, which unfolded between them after Kautsky’s decision to publish in the pages of Die Neue Zeit an article by Berdyaev “F.A. Lange and Critical Philosophy in Its Relation to Socialism” (1900). This correspondence has probably become the catalyst for Berdyaev’s transition from ‛orthodox’ to ‛critical’ Marxism. On the other hand, Bulgakov’s letters to Kautsky (and those of his wife, Helena Tokmakova, to Luisa Kautsky) refer to the time of a research internship of Bulgakov in Berlin in the years 1898–1900. He then met Kautsky and Bernstein families, and engulfed himself in theoretical problems of Marxism. The text of the speech is accompanied by a translation into Polish and provided with comments on two Berdyaev’s letters to Kautsky (February and May 1900).
The study addresses the challenges facing the law of the sea. Although UNCLOS is rightly described as a constitution of the law of the sea, it does not and cannot give answers to all problems and doubts that arise in practice and that are related to global warming, protection of biodiversity, legal status of genetic resources, controversy concerning shipping, delimitation of areas or the protection of underwater cultural heritage. Hence the question arises, what the ways and means of further development of the law of the sea are. Undoubtedly, one of the possibilities is to develop implementation agreements, of which the third devoted to the protection and sustainable use of marine biodiversity outside national jurisdiction is the subject of an international conference convened by the General Assembly, whose resolutions in the area of the law of the sea play an important role. Undoubtedly, also the importance of the organization of the United Nations system, such as the IMO, FAO, UNESCO, UNEP is significant. There is also the possibility of accepting agreements addressing the issues left by UNCLOS without solution or definition. Not without significance is the soft law and the practice of states as well as the position of the organs appointed by UNCLOS.