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Abstract

Tekst prezentuje filozoficzno-filologiczną analizę pojęcia świadomości uwarunkowanej (rnam shes) w filozofii tybetańskiej, z jej korzeniami w myśli indyjskiej. Kontekstem rozważań jest buddyzm, ujęty jako system zmierzający do transformacji świadomości uwarunkowanej w świadomość pierwotną.
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Abstract

W dotychczasowej recepcji Dialogów Stanisława Lema przyjmuje się, że cała moc argumentacyjna skoncentrowana jest na dialogu ostatnim, w którym pisarz — używając terminologii z zakresu cybernetyki — poddaje krytyce ustrój centralnie sterowany. Autorka podejmuje polemikę z przyjętą opinią i wskazuje na inne zadanie, które postawił przed sobą Lem: czy możliwe jest, a jeśli tak, to pod jakimi warunkami, przeszczepienie ludzkiej świadomości na elektromózg? Tym tropem podąża autorka w niniejszym artykule, analizując warunki konieczne i wystarczające do przeprowadzenia transferu świadomości na nośnik niebiologiczny. Przedstawia też stanowisko Lema w odniesieniu do teorii tożsamości osobowej, koncepcji świadomości czy roli, jaką przypisuje on technologii.
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Abstract

The concept of conscience is analyzed here in two different ways: the systematic and the historical-literary. As to the first, systematic perspective, I distinguish (in part 1) three levels of conscience and on every level I identify two opposite categories (conscience that is ‛individual’ versus ‛collective’; ‛emotional’ versus ‛intellectual’; ‛motivating ex ante’ versus ‛evaluating ex post’). In the second, historical-literary perspective, I analyze two literary cases of fictional characters usually thought of as being guided or affected by conscience. The first case is the ancient Greek tragedy and here I offer (in part 2) a comment on the Sophoclean Antigone and the Euripidean Orestes presenting them both as dramas that contain an exemplary formulation of the phenomenon of conscience. Although Antigone and Orestes express their main principles of action in apparently different words, I suggest (in part 3) the two poetical visions of conscience are equally based upon a highly emotional behavior called pathos by the Greek. Thereby I provide a reason, why ancient philosophers created a new concept of conscience intended as an alternative to the poetical vision of human behavior. The new philosophical concept of conscience was based upon an axiological behavior called ethos. I also coin (in part 4) a concept of the ‛community of conscience’ where I distinguish four ‛aspects of solidarity’ in conscience, namely, somebody’s own self, a group of significant persons, a group of the same moral principles, and a sameness of life. In the end I turn (in part 5) to a historical-literary case in Joseph Conrad’s last novel The Rover (1923), which provoked a lively discussion among Polish authors and seems useful as an illustration of several levels of ‛solidarity of conscience’.
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Abstract

According to Nicolai Hartmann, the correlativistic prejudice is the claim that a being must be a correlate of a subject, and this, he argues, is the main prejudice of Husserl’s phenomenology taken as an eidetic science of transcendental consciousness with its correlates. In contrast to Hartmann, the author of this article claims that Husserl’s conception of the noetic-noematic correlation does not lead to the correlativistic prejudice. Husserl distinguishes between two concepts of object: the noematic ‛object simpliciter’ (the pure X) and the ‛object in the How of its determinations’ (a noematic sense), and he demonstrates that the noematic ‛object simpliciter’ transcends the limit of actual noetic-noematic correlation, it is a correlate of the Idea in the Kantian sense of the term and this idea cannot be intrinsically given in its content. In the article the author shows that Husserl’s concept of the noematic ‘object simpliciter’ as a pure X is similar to Kant’s concept of transcendental object as ‛something in general = X’. In analogy to a transcendental object, noematic ‛object simpliciter’ is partially knowable and it appears to be an irrational fact in its unknowable rest. As a consequence, the ‛object simpliciter’ is something more than a correlate of consciousness and retains always its extra-noematic content. Therefore, the world is only partially correlative to the possibility of experience.
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